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Abstract
The manufacturing sector accounts for a substantial share of German GDP,
employment and carbon emissions. Therefore, the manufacturing sector’s energy
use and carbon emissions are of crucial importance for reaching Germany’s climate
goals. In this paper, we analyse energy use patterns in German manufacturing be-
tween 2003 and 2014, using rich administrative micro-data. We find that although
the manufacturing sector has been faced with rising energy costs as a share of total
costs, energy use has not declined except briefly during the economic crisis. We
also find that energy intensity in the manufacturing sector has not decreased sub-
stantially. In contrast, carbon intensity has fallen slightly between 2003 and 2014.
This can be attributed to changes in the fuel mix.
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1 Introduction
The transition away from fossil and to some extent nuclear fuels began in the late 1990s
in Germany. A large number of different policy measures were introduced over the years
starting with the introduction of ecotaxes in 1999. Further policy instruments were
introduced to incentivize the expansion of renewable electricity generation (e.g. feed-
in-tariffs for solar and wind energy financed through the associated Renewable Energy
Surcharge on electricity introduced in 2003). In 2005, the EU emissions trading scheme
was established regulating carbon emissions for certain sectors across the EU. In addition,
the nuclear phaseout initiated in 2000 and reinvigorated after the Fukushima disaster in
2011 has changed the energy landscape in Germany. All these policy measures have
increased the cost of electricity.
The introduction of these policy measures have spurred intense debate on what the
cost in terms of loss of competitiveness and ultimately increasing unemployment may be.
This is particularly the case as climate policy remains a largely national affair with many
unregulated regions around the world. The German economy still depends heavily on
the export-oriented manufacturing sector which accounted for 17% of employment and
25% of GDP in 2018. Due to concerns about competitiveness, several policy measures
feature exemptions for particularly energy-intensive and/or trade-exposed sectors. For
example, generous feed-in-tariffs have contributed to the expansion of renewable elec-
tricity generation driving down electricity costs on the wholesale market. As a result,
the Renewable Energy Surcharge increased dramatically and policy makers responded by
exempting more plants from paying the full surcharge from 2012 onwards.
This paper takes stock of the energy use patterns and trends in the manufacturing
sector from 2003 to 2014. Manufacturing accounted for 30% of final energy demand and
40% of electricity use in 2018. We examine the evolution of fuel use, energy intensity and
carbon emissions using the most detailed administrative data available. Our findings are
sobering: By and large, energy intensity in German manufacturing has remained largely
unchanged over the 12 year period. Fuel switching has however contributed to bringing
down carbon intensity slightly. A growing trend towards self-generation of electricity
can be observed which is consistent with incentives to avoid regulation through electric-
ity surcharges and possibly also the emissions trading scheme. Energy costs have been
rising over time also in terms of their share of total costs, but primarily before 2010.
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We conclude that German manufacturing is still far from achieving substantial emissions
reductions. In consequence, more research is necessary to better understand the effec-
tiveness of individual policy measures targeting energy efficiency and how they can be
improved.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data available for the
analysis and our data preparation. Section 3 discusses the development of energy and
fuel use in manufacturing and energy and carbon intensity. Section 4 takes a closer look
at energy costs at the firm level. Setion 5 examines heterogeneity within manufacturing
and is followed by a short conclusion in Section 6.
2 Data
2.1 The AFiD panels
We investigate the developments in energy use patterns in the manufacturing sector in
Germany using official micro-level data from the Federal Statistical Offices of the Bund
and the La¨nder, the so-called AFiD panels (“Amtliche Firmendaten fu¨r Deutschland”:
Official Firm Data for Germany). Specifically, we make use of the panels “industrial
plants”, “energy use” and “cost structure”.
The panel “industrial plants” contains information on the number of employees per plant,
sales, payroll statistics, the value of output and exports (in e) and further variables on the
economic activities of plants. The AFiD panel collects this information from four individ-
ual sources: the “monthly reports on manufacturing, mining and quarrying plants”, the
“annual report of manufacturing, mining and quarrying plants”, the “investment survey
for manufacturing, mining and quarrying plants” and the “quarterly production survey
for manufacturing plants”. Participation in the survey is mandatory for all industrial
plants in the German manufacturing sector with more than 20 employees. We have data
available from 1995 to 2014.
The information from the panel “industrial plants” is combined with the panel “energy
use”. This data set contains information on the energy use of industrial plants, such as
the consumption of different fuels, electricity procurement, or electricity self-generation.
Again, all plants with more than 20 employees are required to report in the survey. Until
2002, the information on the energy use of plants was based on information from the
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“monthly report on manufacturing, mining and quarrying plants”. In 2003, a separate
survey on the annual energy use of manufacturing, mining and quarrying plants was in-
troduced. Due to the creation of this stand-alone survey, information on energy use are
more accurate and more detailed from 2003 onwards. Since more characteristics of energy
use are available after 2002 and the modification of the reporting leads to breaks in the
data (see e.g. Petrick et al. (2011) on this point), we limit our analysis to the time span
from 2003 to 2014.
The “cost structure survey for the manufacturing, mining and quarrying industries” con-
tains information at the firm level. Hence, while we analyse energy use, emissions and
production variables at the plant level, we look at the firm level when investigating en-
ergy costs and total costs. The cost structure survey covers a sample of around 18,000
firms per year. Bigger firms are more likely to be sampled, and firms with more than 500
employees are fully included in the survey.
Throughout our analyses, we focus our attention on the manufacturing sector that ac-
counted for around 25% of GDP (DeStatis, 2019) and around 30 % of carbon emissions
in 2018.1 This leaves us with a panel of around 40,000 plants per year.
2.2 Data cleaning
While the research data centres and the statistical offices conduct various quality controls
with the data. In addition, we adopt the following separate data cleaning procedure.
First, we drop all observations that reported annual revenues of 0 or 1e as those are
implausible values. Furthermore, we exclude all observations with an annual output of
below 10.000e.
We further exclude all observations that report a negative energetic fuel use and those
observations where our calculated measure of total energy use is below zero. There are
some firms in which one plant reports the energy statistics for several plants within the
firm. While we can identify the firms in which one plant reports the energy data for
several plants, we cannot properly allocate the fuel and electricity use across the plants
and drop all plants within these firms. Finally, we drop outliers in terms of fuel use,
where outliers are defined as plants where one standard deviation of fuel use within the
plant is bigger than 100 times the median fuel use of the plant.
1We drop all observations in the mining and quarrying sector.
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Figure 1 shows the total energy use per year that we lose by conducting this data cleaning
approach. Overall, between 1995 and 2014, we drop around 46,000 observations, roughly
2,300 plants per year.
2.3 Further data sources
The administrative micro-data from the AFiD panels constitute our main data source. We
complement those data with information on emission factors. To measure a plant’s carbon
emissions, we convert its fuel use and electricity procurement into carbon emissions using
emission factors from the German Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt - UBA).
Emission factors for fuel consumption are taken from the publication “Carbon Dioxide
Emissions for the German Atmospheric Emission Reporting 1990-2014”. The factors
used for electricity procurement are taken from “Development of the CO2-emissions of
the German electricity mix from 1990 to 2017”) (Umweltbundesamt, 2016, 2018b). The
exact emission factors used can be found in Table 3 in the Appendix.
Finally, we make use of the commercial producer price index from Destatis to deflate
the monetary values of output (DeStatis, 2018). This is necessary when comparing the
value of output over time: the value of output could have changed both because of price
changes and because of changes in real output. The price index we use accounts for
the fact that developments of prices between sectors can differ. We use the commercial
producer price index from Destatis at the 3-digit sector level (NACE codes).
3 Results
3.1 Energy and fuel use in the German manufacturing sector
Figure 1 depicts the development of the aggregate energy use of the manufacturing sec-
tor over time as well as the median energy use. As can be seen, energy use increased
substantially between 2003 and 2014. In our cleaned data set, energy use increases from
roughly 696 TWh in 2003 to around 859 TWh in 2014 which is an increase of 163 TWh,
or approximately 23%. The 2009 recession in Germany is clearly visible in the data:
From 2008 to 2009, energy use decreased by more than 100 TWh which is equivalent to a
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13% drop as compared to the previous year. However, energy use recovered quickly and
returned to pre-crisis levels already in 2010.
In contrast, the median energy use increased only slightly from 889 MWh in 2003
to 900 MWh in 2014 (i.e. a 1% increase as compared to 2003). This apparently small
increase comes about due to a sharp decline of 8% of the energy use of the median plant
from 2013 to 2014 masking the generally increasing tendency. It is notable that the
energy use of the median single plant firm follows a virtually identical pattern. However,
the increase in total energy use between 2003 and 2014 is less marked for single plant
firms than for all firms (only around 13%), suggesting that the increase in total energy
use is mostly driven by multiplant firms. Revenues have been increasing over the same
period of time (see Figure 2).
Underlying the aggregate statistic on energy use in manufacturing is significant het-
erogeneity in energy use between plants within German manufacturing as depicted in
Figure 3. As can be seen, the mean energy use of the German manufacturing plant is
consistently higher than the 90th percentile. In other words, the distribution of energy
use across plants in the German manufacturing sector is highly right-skewed with a few
large users driving the mean above the 90th percentile. This is in line with the findings
of Petrick et al. (2011) and has not changed over time.
As is shown in Figure 4, most of the variation in the energy use of manufacturing
plants comes from variation in their fuel use: Electricity use has been pretty constant
over time, even in the 2009 recession. In contrast, the use of primary fuels by plants has
incrased significantly over time.
While all 41,459 plants in our sample in 2014 used electricity, gas is the most com-
monly used primary fuel (see Figure 5): In 2014, 28,747 plants (and hence nearly 70% of
all manufacturing plants) consumed gas for energetic purposes (e.g. generating heat or
electricity).2 In terms of aggregate energy use, gas was even more important than elec-
tricity with a use of 344 TWh as compared to 217 TWh for electricity. Coal constitutes
the next most important fuel in terms of aggregate use (148 TWh) even though there are
only few users (389). More than a third of plants use oil, but the aggregate use is less
2To the extent that fuels are used to generate electricity they are double-counted in Figures 5 and
6. We subtract the self-generated electricity in Figures 1 and 4 to accurately represent aggregate energy
use without double-counting.
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Figure 1: Aggregate energy use of the whole industry sector, single plant firms, and the
median (single) plant
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations.
Figure 2: Revenues of all plants across sectors (mean, median, top and bottom percentiles)
in 2015 prices
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Figure 3: Mean, median and dispersion of total energy use by industrial plants between
2003 and 2014
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Figure 4: The development of aggregate fuel use and energy use in all sectors between
2003 and 2014
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than 10 percent of total energy use at 84 TWh. Heat and renewable energy sources are
less commonly used: In 2014, 3,180 plants used a total of 46 TWh of heat, whereas 1,835
plants used renewable energy sources for energetic purposes with an aggregate use of 36
TWh.3
Figure 6 depicts the development of aggregate fuel use over time. Once again, it is
visible that electricity use has remained constant over time. In contrast, the use of oil
has been declining in recent years. Consumption of gas and heat have both increased.
However, while gas accounts for a major share of total fuel use, heat only constitutes a
minor share. It is notable that since 2007, the aggregate use of renewable energy sources
has not increased substantially.
The increase in energy use and the change in the fuel mix in manufacturing over
time obviously affects the overall carbon emissions. Figure 7 shows the evolution of total
carbon emissions from the whole sector, taking account of both indirect emissions from
electricity procurement and of direct emissions from fuel use. Total carbon emissions
have increased from 2003 to 2014, following a path similar to energy use with the 2009
recession constituting a major drop in emissions. Like energy use, however, emissions
almost completely rebounded to the pre-crisis level already in 2010.
Interestingly, electricity procurement and the corresponding indirect emissions follow
a different pattern, as depicted in Figure 8. While the economic crisis in 2009 is also
clearly visible for electricity procurement and indirect emissions, both of those variables
remain below their pre-crisis levels after 2009. Since electricity consumption is relatively
constant over time (Figures 4 and 6), declining electricity procurement after 2009 implies
that electricity self-generation must have increased in those years. Indeed, Figure 9 shows
that self-generation of electricity has become more important in the manufacturing sector:
While self-generated electricity amounted to approximately 30 TWh in 2003, it equaled
nearly 46 TWh in 2014, an increase of more than 50% as compared to 2003. The share
of self-generated electricity in total electricity use has increased from 14% in 2003 to 21%
in 2014 as a result.
3The exact numbers on fuel users and fuel use are displayed in Table 4 in the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Users and consumption of different fuels and electricity in all sectors in 2014
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Figure 6: The consumption of different fuels and electricity over time in all sectors
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For information on the emission factors used for calculating the emissions, see Table 3 in the Appendix.
Figure 7: The development of total emissions from energy use and total energy use from
2003-2014 in all sectors
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Figure 8: The development of (indirect) emissions from electricity procurement and total
electricity procurement from 2003-2014 in all sectors
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Figure 9: The development of aggregate electricity use and self-generation from 2003-2014
in all sectors
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3.2 Energy and carbon intensity
The previous section has shown an upward trend of energy use in the German manu-
facturing sector. Even though total energy use has increased, energy intensity may have
declined in the German manufacturing sector over the years. Petrick et al. (2011) e.g. find
that between 1995 and 2006, energy intensity decreased almost monotonically: According
to their results, the median plant in the manufacturing sector used 18 kWh per 1.000e
of output less in 2002 as compared to 1995. However, they do not account for inflation in
their analysis which implies that the decreases in energy intensity are overstated. Figure
10 depicts the development of energy intensity between 2003 and 2014, once in current
prices and once in deflated prices (2015-prices). We calculate energy intensity as the ratio
between total energy use (in kWh) and the value of (deflated) output (in 1.000e).
The graphs show that once the price development is accounted for, there is little
evidence of a decrease in energy intensity between 2003 and 2014: While it seems that
there is a general declining trend in energy intensity for all plants (i.e. average and
median plant, but also at the 90th percentile), those decreases are much weaker once we
account for inflation.4 This is perhaps surprising given that during this period, several
policies have been imposed with the goal to decrease energy use and energy intensity.
The intuition provided by the graphs is also supported by regression results reported in
Table 1: We regress the logarithm of energy intensity on the year and a plant-fixed effect
µi, clustering standard errors on the plant level:
log(energy intensity)i,t = β × yeart + µi + i,t (1)
If energy intensity has decreased, the coefficient β should take on a negative value. How-
ever, using the deflated value of output to calculate energy intensity, the coefficient is
close to zero and even slightly positive (β = 0.005) corresponding to an increase in in-
tensity of 0.5 percent. Without plant-level fixed effects, energy intensity has declined
4The price deflators from DeStatis are not available for all 3-digit sectors in our sample. Therefore,
the sample underlying the graph with the deflated energy intensities differs slightly from the graph that
does not account for price developments. Specifically, price deflators are not available (at least for some
years) in the sectors 131, 133, 254, 256, 268, 301, 303, 304, 329, 331 and 332. We checked whether
the differences in the development of energy intensities across the two graphs derives from the different
samples by also displaying the development of not-deflated energy intensity excluding the sectors where
no price indices are available. Results are shown in the appendix. The difference in the sample structure
does not seem to be driving the results.
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Figure 10: Energy intensity of all plants across sectors (mean, median top and bottom
percentiles) in current prices (top) and in 2015 prices (bottom)
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Figure 11: Median energy intensity of all plants across sectors in current prices (top) and
in 2015 prices (bottom)
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by 0.2 percent per year on average. The difference between the within-plant regression
(with plant fixed effects) and the between plants regression without fixed effects suggests
that the composition of the manufacturing sector has shifted slightly towards less en-
ergy intensive plants over time, whereas energy intensity within existing plants has not
improved.5
The previous section described how the fuel mix of the German manufacturing sector
has changed over time. Figure 12 shows that even though energy intensity in real terms
has not declined substantially since 2003, fuel switching has led to a slight decrease of
carbon intensity in real terms. The median of carbon intensity decreased by roughly
10 kg per 1,000e of output; reductions in the upper tail of the distribution (i.e. in the
90th percentile) were larger in absolute terms. Rerunning the regression in equation 1 for
carbon intensity yields a statistically significant and negative coefficient for β of around
−0.001, supporting that carbon intensity has decreased over time. On average, carbon
intensity decreased by around 0.1 percent each year. Again the between plants regression
suggest a larger effect of 0.8 percent decline in carbon intensity per year on average.6
Table 1: Regression of energy and carbon intensity on a linear time trend
Energy intensity Energy intensity Carbon intensity Carbon intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
year 0.005∗∗∗ -.002∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ -.008∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0009) (.0004) (.0006)
Plant FE YES NO YES NO
N 441,975 441,975 441,960 441,960
Ngroups 54,844 - 54,842 -
R2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
Notes: The regressions include observations from 2003–2014. The dependent variable is the logarithm of energy intensity (columns (1) and
(2)) or carbon intensity (columns (3) and (4)). Standard errors are clustered at the plant level. p-values are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
5A regression distinguishing between self-generating plants and those without own electricity gener-
ation does not change these results. The interaction of the time trend with a self-generation dummy is
not statistically significant.
6A regression distinguishing between self-generating plants and those without own electricity gener-
ation does not change these results. However, the change in carbon intensity over time is significantly
larger for those plants with self-generation in the between regression.
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Figure 12: Aggregate carbon intensity of all plants across sectors at 2015 prices
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4 Energy costs in German manufacturing
Energy is an important input factor in the production process in German manufacturing.
However, the cost share of energy costs in total costs is rather small, as can be seen in
Figure 13 and Figure 14 making up 2-3 percent of total costs on average.7
The costs for resources and intermediates, labour costs and costs for repair, mainte-
nance, rent, retail and others constitute the bulk of costs in the German manufacturing
sector. Still, in absolute terms, energy costs have grown substantially over the years: In
2003, the sampled firms in the manufacturing sector spent roughly 19 billion e on energy.
In 2014, this number had risen to nearly 32 billion e (in current, not in real prices). This
70% increase is markedly higher than the roughly 40% increase in total costs from 1165
billion e in 2003 to 1613 billion e in 2014.
Hence, energy costs did not only rise in absolute terms in the manufacturing sector,
but also the share of energy costs in total costs has increased, as shown in Figure 14.8
The average energy cost share increased by roughly 37% between 2003 and 2014, the
median even by 47% (albeit from low levels). The increases amount to 35% and 36%,
respectively, for the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution. Hence, the energy cost
share has not only increased for those plants for whom energy constitutes an important
input factor and which already had a relatively high energy cost share in 2003, but the
whole distribution is affected. This is also visible in Figure 15 that illustrates Kernel-
densities of the logged energy cost share for 2007 and 2014: The distribution of cost
shares shifts to the right but also becomes more compressed. The cost share for the
upper percentiles of the distribution does not change. This may be explained by the
existence of a variety of policy exemptions and reductions in taxes and charges for very
energy and electricity intensive plants and firms.
Since energy intensity has not changed substantially over time, as discussed in the
previous section, it seems likely that increases in the energy cost share are due to increases
in energy and electricity prices. In fact prices for gas and oil increased substantially
7Energy costs are reported in the cost structure survey as an aggregate measure for the firm, but not
the expenditure on individual fuels or electricity. Expenditures for emission allowances is not included
in the energy costs.
8The developments of labour cost shares, capital cost shares and resource/intermediate inputs cost
shares are shown in Figures 25, 26 and 27 in the Appendix.
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/42251.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42251.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations.
The sample consists of a subsample of firms in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 13: Development of total costs over time at current prices
between 2003 and 2008 and returned to a high level after the crisis until 2014 when they
again started to fall (see Figure 36 in the appendix). According to Eurostat, electricity
prices consistently increased between 2007 and 2014 largely due to increases in taxes and
levies (see Figure 37 in the appendix). The fact that the cost share increases, but energy
intensity does not shift much suggests that energy demand may not be very elastic in
manufacturing or that firms expected high energy and electricity prices to be temporary.
However, this requires further analysis of the response of individual plants to energy costs.
The energy cost share is not necessarily the best measure of the potential impact of
rising energy costs on competitiveness of German plants. The “real unit energy cost”
(Energiestu¨ckkosten) has been used as an indicator in the monitoring process of the
energy transition. This measure relates the energy costs to value added, i.e. the energy
requirement in Euros to produce one Euro of value added. While it is more informative
than the energy cost share alone, the real unit energy cost underestimates the burden as
it does not account for “indirect” energy costs embodied in intermediate inputs. Lo¨schel
et al. (2015) estimate that the importance of such indirect energy costs has been increasing
sharply over time. Figure 16 shows a kernel density plot of the log-real unit energy cost
for the years 2007, 2010 and 2014. There is a clear shift to the right between 2007 and
2010, but very little change between 2010 and 2014, though the distribution seems to be
23
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Figure 14: Development of mean, median, top and bottom percentiles of energy cost
share from total costs over time
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The graph depicts the Kernel-density of the log-energy share from total costs. The sample consists in a
subsample of firms in the German manufacturing sector.
Figure 15: Distribution of log-energy share from total costs for 2007 and 2014
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slightly less concentrated. The median real unit energy cost was around 3 cents per Euro
value added in 2003 and increased to 4.7 cents per Euro in 2014. For the 90th percentile,
the real unit energy cost increased from 13 cents per Euro value added to 20 cents per
Euro, with the strongest increase in the period before the financial crisis in 2009.
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The graph depicts the Kernel-density of the log of real unit energy cost for the years 2007, 2010 and
2014. The sample consists of the subsample of firms in the German manufacturing sector reporting in
the cost structure survey.
Figure 16: Distribution of log-real unit energy costs for 2007, 2010 and 2014
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5 Sectoral variation in energy use and energy inten-
sity
The difference between average energy use of plants in the German manufacturing sec-
tor and the energy use of plants at the 10th percentile of the distribution of energy use
depicted in Figure 3 already gave a glimpse of the heterogeneity between manufactur-
ing plants. Petrick et al. (2011) showed that even within more narrowly defined 3-digit
sectors, there are large differences between plants. Given this dispersion, this section
examines the sectoral variation in energy use and energy intensity in more detail.9
Figure 17 shows the ten 3-digit sectors with the highest median energy intensity in 2014
within German manufacturing. Among the top ten sectors with respect to energy inten-
sity are sectors in the ceramics and cement industry (i.e. NACE code 235, 233, 232 and
234). Also the pulp and paper industry (171) and the textiles industry (133) rank among
the sectors with the highest median energy intensity. The list closely resembles the one
of Petrick et al. (2011) for the year 2006; the sectors that were the most energy intensive
ones in 2006 are the same ones that appear in our list for 2014.
The figure also visualizes the within-sector variation in energy intensity: The light
bars display the range between top and bottom quartiles, the darker bars show the range
between top and bottom deciles of the distribution of energy intensity across plants
within a sector. As can be seen, even within quite narrowly defined 3-digit sectors there is
substantial variation in the plants’ energy intensities that cannot be captured by focusing
on the average or median energy-intensity of a sector.
From the bivariate correlations depicted in Figure 18, it can be seen that the sec-
tors with higher median energy intensities tend to also have higher median energy uses,
higher median emissions and higher median emission intensities. The correlation between
median energy intensity and median electricity share in the energy mix is negative, in-
dicating that the energy-intensive sectors rely more heavily on primary fuels. However,
is is notable that as compared to the findings of Petrick et al. (2011), the correlation
9Some 3-digit sectors in the manufacturing sector are only represented by few plants in the adminis-
trative micro-data. Confidentiality however requires a minimal number of observations for each statistic
released. In order not to lose those observations and sectors, we merge very small sectors that are not
too different with respect to their energy use behaviour together. A list of the merged sectors can be
found in the Appendix.
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. Note that sector
“manufacture of coke” (191) is among the top ten sectors with respect to energy intensity, but cannot
be shown for confidentiality reasons.
Figure 17: The ten sectors with the highest median energy intensity in 2014
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. Correlation co-
efficients on the dispersion of those variables can be found in Table 6 in the Appendix.
Figure 18: Coefficients of correlation between median energy intensity and different en-
ergy and production variables in 2014 (across sectors)
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coefficient has decreased to approximately -0.2 in 2014 as compared to -0.4 in 2006. It is
also notable that there are positive correlations between the median of energy intensity
with the median of several production variables (value of output, payroll, workforce),
while Petrick et al. (2011) found no correlations.
The sectors that have the highest (lowest) median energy intensity are mostly also among
those with the highest (lowest) median energy use and the highest (lowest) median car-
bon intensity as seen in Figures 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 in the Appendix. There is no
clear pattern between the variation in energy intensity and median energy intensity (as
shown in Figure 20), nor between the variation in energy intensity and the variation in
energy use or other production variables, as shown in Figure 19. The dispersion of energy
intensity and other variables is measured by the interquartile-range-to-median-ratio, i.e.
the dispersion of a given variable in a given sector is normalized by the median in order
to render the dispersion measure comparable across different distributions with different
medians.
Sectors that are very heterogeneous with respect to energy intensity of plants do not
necessarily exhibit a large variation with respect to the plants’ energy use: Computing
a simple bivariate correlation yields a correlation coefficient of only around 0.45. The
same holds for the value of output, payroll and workforce.10 The lack of a clear pattern
has already been shown by Petrick et al. (2011) for the year 2006 and still holds in
2014. Moreover, sectors with a high median energy-intensity are not necessarily the
sectors where there is large variation with respect to energy intensity: The correlation
between the sectors’ median energy intensities and their interquartile-range-to-median-
ratio equaled only -0.03 in 2014. There is substantial variation within sectors, especially
with respect to energy use as it was also the case in 2006 according to Petrick et al.
(2011).
Sectors within the manufacturing sector are also quite diverse with respect to their
fuel mix: Table 2 shows the top ten and bottom five sectors with respect to the fuel share
of different fuels in their energy mix.11 Overall, the results confirm the earlier intuition:
Sectors that are very energy intensive have lower electricity shares in their energy mix.
10The correlations are reported in Table 6 in the Appendix.
11The Table calculates fuel shares in the energy mix on a sector level. This masks the heterogeneity
of plants within the sector with respect to their fuel mix. Figures 33, 34 and 35 in the Appendix show
the within sector variation in energy and natural gas shares in the energy mix for selected sectors.
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. Note that sector
“manufacture of coke” (191) is among the top ten sectors with respect to energy intensity, but cannot
be shown for confidentiality reasons.
Figure 19: Variation ((p75-p25)/p50) of several key variables for the ten most and five
least energy intensive sectors in 2014
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. Sectors are
ranked according to ((p90-p10)/p50). Note that sector “manufacture of coke” (191) cannot be shown for
confidentiality reasons. For “Manufacture of magnetic and optical media” (268), confidentiality allows
only to depict the median.
Figure 20: Variation ((p90-p10)/p50) of energy intensity relative to the median (left) and
median of energy intensity (right) for the top ten and bottom five sectors with respect to
variation in energy intensity (2014 data)
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Both the Cement industry (235) and the Ceramic industry (233) that are among the
top five with respect to their energy intensity in 2014 are among those sectors with the
lowest electricity share in 2014. As compared to the results by Petrick et al. (2011), it is
notable that, while we find the same sectors to be very coal- and oil-intensive, the shares
of those fuels in their energy mix has decreased. This confirms again the occurrence of
fuel switching in the German manufacturing sector.
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Table 2: The sectors with the highest and lowest respective fuel share in their 2014 energy mix
Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. Own calculations. All shares are computed from sector
aggregates, including plants with no fuel use. Sectors with the lowest respective fuel share in 2014 (bottom part of the table) are only
shown if distinct from zero.
Electricity Gas Oil Heat Renewables Coal Other fuels
72.5%: 237 95.5%: 191 72.5%: 192 53.7%: 211 78.2%: 161 58.6%: 240 34.8%: 235
69.1%: 268 85.6%: 233 15.8%: 322 31.7%: 206 69.8%: 162 37.7%: 235 4.1%: 200
67.1%: 257 83.2%: 232 15.0%: 321 23.5%: 204 31.7%: 310 36.3%: 239 3.8%: 171
66.4%: 273 79.1%: 234 14.2%: 143 22.0%: 261 17.4%: 171 18.7%: 245 1.7%: 204
66.3%: 261 77.3%: 231 13.3%: 237 21.2%: 302 11.9%: 322 16.2%: 108 1.5%: 233
66.1%: 272 76.3%: 133 12.3%: 140 19.2%: 291 9.7%: 172 14.3%: 205 1.0%: 211
65.4%: 222 71.4%: 105 12.3%: 264 17.0%: 267 8.5%: 323 9.6%: 204 0.8%: 239
64.7%: 267 68.9%: 109 12.2%: 324 15.5%: 212 7.2%: 107 8.7%: 171 0.8%: 192
64.1%: 255 68.4%: 100 10.2%: 292 14.9%: 331 6.9%: 252 5.8%: 252 0.4%: 244
63.0%: 279 63.3%: 236 9.0%: 331 13.3%: 100 6.9%: 273 5.6%: 133 0.4%: 221
11.8%: 235 11.7%: 261 0.3%: 171
10.8%: 240 9.8%: 162 0.3%: 272
10.2%: 233 8.8%: 237 0.1%: 206
7.2%: 192 5.1%: 235 0.1%: 268
4.5%: 191 0.2%: 161 0%: 191
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6 Conclusion
The manufacturing sector accounts for a substantial share of German GDP, employment
and carbon emissions. Therefore, the manufacturing sector’s energy use and carbon
emissions are of crucial importance for reaching Germany’s climate goals. In this paper,
we analyse energy use patterns in the German manufacturing sector between 2003 and
2014, using a rich data set of administrative micro-data. We show that although the
manufacturing sector has been faced with rising energy costs as a share of total costs,
energy use has not declined (except briefly during the economic crisis). We also find
that energy intensity in the manufacturing sector has not decreased substantially. In
contrast, carbon intensity has been reduced slightly between 2003 and 2014. This can
be attributed to changes in the fuel mix in the manufacturing sector: In particular, we
show that oil is declining in terms of aggregate use over the years, while gas is becoming
more important. In the period we also observe a substantial increase in electricity self-
generation in the manufacturing sector. Whether this shift is due to regulation, e.g.
rising electricity charges and exemptions for self-generated electricity is an important
question for future research. The manufacturing sector remains very heterogeneous in
terms of energy use: In our paper, we confirm the findings by Petrick et al. (2011) and
show that also in 2014, sectors within German manufacturing are very different in terms
of their energy use, energy intensity and emissions intensity. We find that even within
3-digit sectors, plants vary substantially with regards to their energy use behaviour. Our
paper sheds light on how energy use patterns in the manufacturing sector have evolved
over time. The extent to which these developments have been driven by policy or fuel
prices is unclear. Further research should address the causal impact of individual policy
measures and their interaction effects to identify potential for improving policy design
and achieving further necessary reductions in carbon emissions.
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Table 3: Emission factors for different fuels and electricity procured
All years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Electricity 639 618 616 623 642 605 582 574 573 596 607 595
District heat12 332.4
Natural gas/associated gas 201.6
Liquified gas 233.8 234.9 235.1 235.3 239.8 234.8 234.9 235.2 235.4 235.4 235.5 235.9
Light fuel oil 266.5
Hard coal 337.9 338 337.9 338.2 337.7 339.5 338.8 338.5 339.2 337.2 336.1 336.8
Coke 389.3
Raw lignite 392.8 393.2 389.6 386.3 386.5 383.3 381.8 382.8 381.7 377.9 378.5 373.6
Brown coal briquettes 356.4 357.4 357.4 356.4 358.7 359.4 357.7 356.4 357.4 357.4 356.7 358.4
Heavy fuel 287.1 287.1 286.4 286.9 287.2 288.3 284.2 286.9 287.5 288.2 288 292.8
Other coal products13 276.1
Other petroleum products14 277.2 277.7 277.1 277.2 277.7 278.2 281.6 284.9 282.2 282.5 282.6 282.2
Renewables 015
Other gas products16 332.7 332.6 327.2 330.8 323.9 331.4 339.3 333 338.5 337.2 334.1 331.1
Industrial waste and other fuels 256 256 256.1 256.1 256.1 256.1 256 256 256 256 256 256
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12Emission factors for heat are taken from Umweltbundesamt (2018a). This publication contains emission factors for the years 2000 and 2005; since it is not
clear whether this yields more reliable emission factors, we abstain from extrapolating the emission factors between 2000 and 2005 and just use the 2005 emission
factor. Measurement error with respect to the emission factor for district heat should not have large consequences, since per year less than 3.500 plants use heat
(before data cleansing)
13The emission factor is calculated by taking the average of the emission factors from hard coal briquettes, other coal products, brown coal coke, fluidized
bed coal and pulverized coal. Since it is not clear to which weights those coal products are contained in the variable “other coal products”, we use a simple
unweighted average here. Less than 250 plants per year consume other coal products.
14The emission factor is obtained by taking the unweighted average of the emission factors of other petroleum products, diesel oil, refinery gas and petroleum
coke. Users of other petroleum products amount to less than 210 per year
15For renewable energy sources, we use an emission factor of 0. While in principle, also burning biomass or landfill gas is associated with emissions, hydropower
or solar power do not cause emissions. From our data, it is hard to distinguish those cases and to assign an appropriate emission factor. Therefore we use an
emission factor of 0 as has also been done in previous studies (e.g. Petrick et al. 2011)
16The emission factors consist of unweighted averages of the emission factors of coke oven gas, blast furnace and converter gas, other gases and mine gas.
Weights on the different components of “other gas products” are unavailable. However, other gas products are used by few plants in any case (maximally 50
plants per year)
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Table 4: Users and aggregate use of different fuels in 2014
Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. Own calculations.
number of users aggregate use (TWh)
Electricity 41.459 217
Gas 28.747 344
Oil 14.967 84
Coal 389 148
Heat 3.180 47
Renewables 1.835 36
Others 116 22
Table 5: List of merged sectors:
Merged sector code Original sector code
100 The fruit and vegetable processing industry (103)
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats (104)
120 Beverage production (110)
Tobacco processing (120)
140 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel (141)
Manufacture of articles of fur (142)
180 The production of printing products (181)
The reproduction services of recorded media (182)
200 Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber in
primary forms (201)
Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products (202
240 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys (241)
Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related fittings of steel (242)
303 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery (303)
Manufacture of military fighting vehicles (304)
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. The sectors 131,
133, 254, 256, 268, 301, 303, 304, 329, 331 and 332 are not included/not included for the whole time
period in this graph.
Figure 21: Aggregate energy intensity in current prices for the sample for which price
deflators are available
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. The graph de-
picts the Kernel-density of the logartihm of deflated energy intensity. Information on price deflators are
taken from DeStatis (2018).
Figure 22: Distribution of log-energy intensity at 2015 prices in 2003, 2009 and 2014
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. Information on
price deflators are taken from DeStatis (2018).
Figure 23: Development of median carbon intensity over time at 2015 prices
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. The graph de-
picts the Kernel-density of the logartihm of deflated carbon intensity. Information on price deflators are
taken from DeStatis (2018).
Figure 24: Distribution of log-carbon intensity at 2015 prices in 2003, 2009 and 2014
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/42251.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42251.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations.
The sample consists of a subsample of firms in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 25: Development of labour cost share from total costs over time
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/42251.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42251.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations.
The sample consists of a subsample of firms in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 26: Development of capital cost share from total costs over time
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The sample consists of a subsample of firms in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 27: Development of resource/intermediate inputs cost share from total costs over
time
49
0500000
1000000
M
W
h
235 171 233 105 206 244 200 232 291 106
p10−p90 p25−p75 p50
Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. Note that sector
“manufacture of coke” (191) is among the top ten sectors with respect to energy use, but cannot be
shown for confidentiality reasons.
Figure 28: The ten sectors with the highest median energy use in 2014
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations. Note that sector
“manufacture of coke” (191) is among the top ten sectors with respect to carbon intensity, but cannot
be shown for confidentiality reasons.
Figure 29: The ten sectors with the highest median carbon intensity in 2014
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations.
Figure 30: The five sectors with the lowest median energy intensity in 2014
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. Own calculations.
Figure 31: The five sectors with the lowest median energy use in 2014
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0. Own calculations.
Figure 32: The five sectors with the lowest median carbon intensity in 2014
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Table 6: Correlation of sector heterogeneity between selected variables
Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI: 10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0.
Own calculations.
Correlation of heterogeneity (p90-10)/p50 Total energy use Energy intensity Value of output electricity share carbon intensity workforce payroll
Total energy use 1
Energy intensity 0.45 1
Value of output 0.36 0.12 1
electricity share 0.15 0.16 -0.01 1
carbon intensity 0.40 0.96 0.13 0.12 1
workforce 0.13 -0.00 0.85 0.13 0.03 1
payroll 0.12 0.01 0.88 0.07 0.04 0.98 1
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. Own calculations.
For “Manufacture of magnetic and optical media” (268), confidentiality allows only to depict the median.
Figure 33: The ten sectors with the highest median electricity share in their 2014 energy
mix
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. and DOI:
10.21242/42111.2003.00.01.1.1.0 to 10.21242/42111.2014.00.01.1.1.0.Own calculations. Note that sec-
tor “manufacture of coke” (191) is among the bottom five sectors with respect to the electricity share in
the energy mix, but cannot be shown for confidentiality reasons.
Figure 34: The five sectors with the lowest median electricity share in their 2014 energy
mix
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Source: DOI: 10.21242/43531.2003.00.03.1.1.0 to 10.21242/43531.2014.00.03.1.1.0. Own calculations.
Figure 35: The ten sectors with the highest median natural gas share in their 2014 energy
mix
Fuel prices for gas, hard coal and oil from 2003 until 2018. The prices on gas and hard coal come from
the website of the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA). The prices for oil
come from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website.
Figure 36: Fuel prices for gas, hard coal and oil
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 Source: Eurostat time series nrg pc 205 and nrg pc 205 c.
Figure 37: The development of electricity prices for different consumption bands
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